The Professors Who Would Become Popes: Academic Human Capital and Elite Selection in Premodern Europe

Mara Vitale and David De La Croix

No 22131, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Between 999 and 1800, 133 pontiffs ascended to the papal throne of the Catholic Church. Drawing on the RETE database of premodern European academia, we identify 22 popes or antipopes who held teaching positions before their election. The pattern is striking: all were elected before 1600. Biographical evidence further suggests that academic popes often came from more modest social backgrounds than the great Roman and Italian families that otherwise played a central role in papal selection, while simple measures of papal activity do not reveal systematic differences between former professors and other pontiffs. We interpret these facts through an economic lens. Premodern universities were not only producers of knowledge; they could also certify ability, provide access to elite career ladders, and allow acquired human capital to substitute partly for inherited social capital. The disappearance of academic popes is consistent with a decline in the ecclesiastical return to academic capital as universities became more secular, seminaries and curial careers provided alternative routes to advancement, and family and political networks became more important in elite recruitment.

Keywords: Elite human capital; Social mobility; Occupational choice; Church and University; Medieval Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I25 J24 J62 N33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP22131 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:22131

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP22131

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().