Heterogeneous CEO Death Effects

Dirk Jenter, Egor Matveyev and Lukas Roth

No 22145, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper analyzes changes in firm value, performance, and behavior caused by CEO deaths. Many deaths trigger large stock price changes—shareholders believe that some CEOs add shareholder value, but others are seen as not optimally matched or overpaid. These value changes are correlated with CEO and firm characteristics (e.g., deaths of old CEOs tend to add value), but much of the variation remains unexplained. The market reactions predict changes in operating performance, indicating that shareholders know which CEOs improve performance and which do not. The evidence suggests that CEOs are important, but also that many reduce shareholder value.

Keywords: CEO death; Ceos; Ceo-firm matching; Ceo labor markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 M12 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11
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