Procurement Favouritism and Technology Adoption

Fernando Branco

No 2270, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The design of cost minimizing procurement rules for the selection of contractors among distinct technological groups requires the favouritism of inefficient firms. It is unclear whether these policies provide incentives for inefficient firms to adopt more efficient technologies. In this paper the inefficient firm may adopt the efficient technology at some cost. Government policy can be effective for an intermediate range of adoption costs. To induce adoption, the government should commit to favour the (initially) inefficient firm, despite both firms eventually having the same technology. Even with limited government commitment, optimal favouritism provides more incentives for technology adoption than a symmetric mechanism.

Keywords: Auctions; Procurement; Protection; Technology Adoption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 F13 H57 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-10
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