Democratization or Repression?

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson

No 2278, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite. We argue that the reason why the elite may have to resort to full-scale democratization, despite its apparent costs to themselves, may be that lesser concessions would be viewed as a sign of weakness, spurring further unrest and more radical demands. The elite may therefore be forced to choose between repression and the most generous concession, a transition to full democracy.

Keywords: Democracy; Redistribution; Repression; Revolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 O15 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-10
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2278 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Democratization or repression? (2000)
Working Paper: Democratization or Repression? (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2278

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=2278

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().