Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence

Jakob de Haan, Sylvester Eijffinger and Helge Berger ()

No 2353, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper reviews recent research on central bank independence (CBI). After we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness, the literature on optimal inflation contracts is discussed, followed by research in which the inflationary bias is endogenized. Finally, the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on CBI are reviewed. We conclude that the negative relationship between CBI and inflation is quite robust.

Keywords: Central bank independence and conservativeness; Inflation targeting; Optimal inflation contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence (2001)
Working Paper: Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence (2000)
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