Work Environment And Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials In A Large Italian Firm

Andrea Ichino and Giovanni Maggi

No 2387, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The prevalence of shirking within a large Italian bank appears to be characterized by significant regional differentials. In particular, absenteeism and misconduct episodes are substantially more prevalent in the south. We consider a number of potential explanations for this fact: different individual backgrounds; group-interaction effects; sorting of workers across regions; differences in local attributes; different hiring policies and discrimination against southern workers. Our analysis suggests that individual backgrounds, group-interaction effects and sorting effects contribute to explain the north-south shirking differential. None of the other explanations appears to be of first-order importance.

Keywords: Group interaction effects; Regional differentials; Shirking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J20 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (417)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm (2000)
Working Paper: Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm (1999)
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