Monotone Matching In Perfect And Imperfect Worlds
Andrew Newman
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Patrick Legros
No 2396, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfections and/or incentive problems. We provide necessary and sufficient distribution-free conditions for monotone matching which depend on the relationship between what we call the segregation payoff - a generalization of the individually rational payoff - and the feasible set for a pair of types. Imperfections have two distinct effects that are relevant for equilibrium matching patterns: they can overwhelm the complementarity properties of the production technology and they can introduce nontransferabilities that make equilibrium matching inefficient. We also use our framework to reveal the source of differences in the comparative static properties of some models in the literature and to explore the effects of distribution on the equilibrium matching pattern.
Keywords: Assortative matching; Contracts; Imperfect markets; Organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D51 L10 L22 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)
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Journal Article: Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds (2002) 
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