Can Competition Replace Regulation for Small Utility Customers?

Richard Green

No 2406, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Many utility markets are now being opened to competition, and some regulators have expressed the hope that this will make the regulation of consumer prices unnecessary. In this paper, entrants offer (differentiated) 'added value', but consumers incur a switching cost if they buy from one of them. The incumbent's profit-maximising price may be well above the level of its costs. This is likely to be the case in the UK's energy industries, but competition may be able to replace regulation in telecommunications, where marginal costs are lower, demand elasticity higher, and entrants can give more 'added value'.

Keywords: Competition; Regulation; Switching costs; Utilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L50 L90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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