Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate From Welfare to Work
Jan van Ours,
Gerard van den Berg and
Bas van der Klaauw
No 2447, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
In The Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This paper investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition from welfare to work using a unique set of rich administrative data on welfare recipients in The Netherlands. We find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work. We also describe the other determinants of the transition from welfare to work.
Keywords: Punishment; Search effort; Unemployment duration; Welfare agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C41 J64 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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