On the Welfare Effects of Competition for Foreign Direct Investments
Chiara Fumagalli
No 2468, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
This paper studies the effects of subsidy competition for the location of a multinational enterprise (MNE). We assume that a (poorer) region enjoys larger gains from the positive externalities associated with the inward investment but that the MNE would find it more profitable to locate to the other (richer) region, subsidies being equal. In this setting, subsidy competition can improve aggregate welfare relative to a policy that bans grants because it gives the chance to the region that needs it more to attract the investment. The paper analyses under which conditions this is the case, assuming either that the multinational a priori decided to invest abroad or that exports are a feasible alternative to FDI. The welfare effects of subsidy competition can, accordingly, be extremely different.
Keywords: Business location; Foreign direct investments; Tax competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H73 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP2468 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2468
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP2468
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().