Try Me! On Job Assignments as a Screening Device

Juan D. Carrillo

No 2552, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the optimal allocation of screening tasks between two agents (incumbent vs. outsider or senior vs. junior) competing for one job. First, we characterize the inefficiencies from the principal's viewpoint of delegating the selection of the screening procedure to the incumbent. In general, the information disclosed by the screening tasks and the turnover rates will be inefficiently small due to the incumbent's willingness to undertake too many of these tasks. Second, we show that it may be optimal for organizations to favour the selection of outsider/junior agents relative to incumbent/senior ones because the former have greater implicit (career concern type) incentives than the latter to exert effort and perform efficiently.

Keywords: Screening; Job allocation; Career concerns; Relative evaluation; Personnel economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D73 D80 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-09
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