Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory

Paul Klemperer

No 2572, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful argument and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.

Keywords: Auctions; Bidding; Auction theory; Private values; Common values; Mechanism design; Litigation; Stock markets; Queues; Financial crashes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D43 D44 D45 G14 K41 L13 L81 L94 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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