Impeded Industrial Restructuring: The Growth Penalty

David Audretsch () and Roy Thurik

No 2648, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper documents that a process of industrial restructuring has been transforming the developed economies, where large corporations are accounting for less economic activity and small firms are accounting for a greater share of economic activity. Not all countries, however, are experiencing the same shift in their industrial structures. Very little is known about the cost of resisting this restructuring process. The goal of this paper is to identify whether there is a cost, measured in terms of foregone growth, of an impeded restructuring process. The cost is measured by linking growth rates of European countries to deviations from the optimal industrial structure. The empirical evidence suggests that countries impeding the restructuring process pay a penalty in terms of foregone growth.

Keywords: Industry structure; Firm size distribution; entrepreneurship; Economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Impeded Industrial Restructuring: The Growth Penalty (2002)
Working Paper: Impeded Industrial Restructuring: The Growth Penalty (2000)
Working Paper: Impeded Industrial Restructuring: The Growth Penalty (2000)
Working Paper: Impeded industrial restructuring: The growth penalty (2000)
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