Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships

Michael Spagat, Kenneth Simons and Jody Overland ()

No 2653, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We model growth in dictatorships facing each period an endogenous probability of ‘political catastrophe’ that would extinguish the regime's wealth extraction ability. Domestic capital exhibits a bifurcation point determining economic growth or shrinkage. With low initial domestic capital the dictator plunders the country's resources and the economy shrinks. With high initial domestic capital the economy eventually grows faster than is socially optimal.

Keywords: Political economy; Growth; Dictatorship; Bifurcations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D90 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political instability and growth in dictatorships (2005)
Working Paper: Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships (2003)
Working Paper: Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships (2000)
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