Quantifying the Effects from Horizontal Mergers in European Competition Policy

Marc Ivaldi and Frank Verboven

No 2697, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This Paper starts from a recent case studying how merger analysis in Europe may potentially be improved through simulation analysis. Starting from the product and geographic market definition in the Merger Decision, we formulate and estimate an oligopoly model with differentiated products. The model is simulated to account for the changed multiproduct ownership structure after the merger. We show how our first two tests, a potential and an actual market power test, produce useful information, complementary to the traditional dominance principle adopted in the European Union. A drastic revision of current merger principles is thus not required. We also show how simulation analysis can provide useful additional information that goes beyond the traditional dominance principle. This is illustrated through two examples. First, we analyse the effects of efficiencies through cost savings. Second, we compare alternative merger scenarios.

Keywords: Merger analysis; Competition policy; Differentiated product markets; Nested logit models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 L41 L62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Journal Article: Quantifying the effects from horizontal mergers in European competition policy (2005)
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