Working in Public and Private Firms

Rafael Rob and Giacomo Corneo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Rafael Robb

No 2719, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We develop a theoretical framework for comparing the style of work in public and private enterprises. We incorporate ?socializing?, as an activity that yields utility for workers and affects a firm?s output, into a simple multitask model of work organization. In contrast with previous models, we establish the two following results. First, the optimal workers? compensation policy displays a larger incentive intensity in the private firm than in the public firm. Second, labour productivity in the private firm may be higher or lower than in the public firm. Both results fit well with the findings of empirical work.

Keywords: Public enterprise; Privatization; Incentive schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L32 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Working in public and private firms (2003)
Working Paper: Working in Public and Private Firms
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