Strategic R&D Policy

John Beath, Yannis Katsoulacos and David Ulph

No 276, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The outcome of technological competition between firms (or countries) depends on the resolution of two forces: the profit incentive and the competitive threat. This is illustrated using a simple duopoly model. This model is then used to analyze two policy issues: subsidizing R & D and collaborative research ventures. In evaluating the second of these, some use is made of numerical simulations.

Keywords: Duopoly; Industrial Policy; Innovation; Joint Ventures; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1988-10
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Journal Article: Strategic R&D Policy (1989)
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