Imperfect Competition, Underemployment Equilibria and Fiscal Policy
Marco Pagano
No 280, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
It is often claimed that the demand externality created by imperfectly competitive markets can provide an analytical basis for Keynesian fiscal policy prescriptions. Here this demand externality is embedded in a model where saving and employment are determined by optimizing choices in an imperfectly competitive setting. It turns out that underemployment equilibria do exist, that there is scope for fiscal intervention, but that Keynesian fiscal prescriptions are turned on their head. Demand externalities among imperfectly competitive firms do not in general provide a theoretical basis for these prescriptions, unless supplemented by other deviations from the Walrasian standard in the labor or capital market.
Keywords: Employment; Externalities; Fiscal Policy; Imperfect Competition; Underemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=280 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Journal Article: Imperfect Competition, Underemployment Equilibria and Fiscal Policy (1990) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:280
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... pers/dp.php?dpno=280
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().