The European UMTS/IMT-2000 Licence Auctions

Philippe Jehiel () and Benny Moldovanu ()

No 2810, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Europe has taken the global lead in the issuance of third generation (3G) licences for mobile telecommunications according to the UMTS/IMT-2000 family of standards. We survey the recent European UMTS licence auctions and compare their outcomes with the predictions of a simple auction model that emphasises future market structure as a main determinant of valuations for licenses. Since the main goal of most spectrum allocation procedures is economic efficiency, and since consumers (who are affected by the ensuing market structure) do not participate at the auction stage, good designs must alleviate the asymmetry among incumbents and potential entrants by actively encouraging entry.

Keywords: Licence auctions; Market entry; Umts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D45 L13 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP2810 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The European UMTS/IMT-2000 license auctions (2001)
Working Paper: The European UMTS/IMT-2000 License Auctions (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2810

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP2810

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().