Counselling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Controlled Social Experiment

Gerard van den Berg and Bas van der Klaauw

No 2986, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We investigate the effect of counselling and monitoring on the individual employment transition rate. We theoretically analyse these policies in a job search model with two search channels and endogenous search effort. In the empirical analysis we use unique administrative and survey data concerning a social experiment with full randomization and compliance. The results show that counselling and monitoring do not affect the work exit rate. Monitoring causes a shift from informal to formal job searching. We combine our empirical results with the results from our theoretical analysis and the existing empirical literature to establish a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of these policies.

Keywords: Unemployment duration; Search effort; Active labour market policy; Treatment; Search channels; Multi-tasking; Randomized social experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J58 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Related works:
Journal Article: COUNSELING AND MONITORING OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM A CONTROLLED SOCIAL EXPERIMENT (2006)
Working Paper: Counseling and monitoring of unemployed workers: theory and evidence from a controlled social experiment (2001)
Working Paper: Counseling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Controlled Social Experiment (2001)
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