Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice

Lucian Bebchuk () and Allen Ferrell

No 3006, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In a recent article, we have put forward a new approach to takeover law and regulatory competition. We proposed a ?choice-enhancing? federal intervention that would provide: (i) an optional body of substantive federal takeover law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and which would be more hospitable than existing state takeover law, and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers? wishes, proposals for option into (or out of) the federal takeover law. In this Paper, we respond to critics of our proposal, and we further develop the case for it.

Keywords: Takeover law; Regulatory competition; Federal takeover; State takeover; Shareholder (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 H70 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10
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