International Protection of Intellectual Property

Gene Grossman and Edwin Lai ()

No 3118, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size, in their capacities for innovation and in their absolute and comparative advantage in manufacturing. We associate the strength of IPR protection with the duration of a country?s patents that are applied with national treatment. After describing the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, ?why are patents longer in the North?? We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.

Keywords: Patents; Intellectual property; Harmonization; Trips (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lam
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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Related works:
Journal Article: International Protection of Intellectual Property (2004)
Working Paper: International Protection of Intellectual Property (2004)
Working Paper: International Protection of Intellectual Property (2002)
Working Paper: International Protection of Intellectual Property (2002)
Working Paper: International Protection of intellectual Property (2001)
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