Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules

Charles Wyplosz

No 3238, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The Paper explores how fiscal policy can be made both more disciplined and more counter-cyclical. It first examines whether the decline of public debts observed in the OECD area during the 1990s can be explained either by less activism or by a priority towards consolidation. It then argues that rules, for example the Stability and Growth Pact, are less likely to deliver the desired outcome than institutions. Drawing a parallel with monetary policy, it examines how a Fiscal Policy Committee could reproduce what Monetary Policy Committees have achieved in central banking.

Keywords: Fiscal policy; Discipline; Cyclicality; Rules and discretion; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 E32 E63 H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

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Journal Article: Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules (2005)
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