Deposit Insurance and International Bank Deposits

Harry Huizinga and Nicodème, Gaëtan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gaetan J.A. Nicodeme

No 3244, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper examines how international depositors respond to national deposit insurance policies. Countries with explicit deposit insurance are found to be relatively attractive to international non-bank depositors. Schemes characterized by co-insurance, a private administration, and a low deposit insurance premium appear to be particularly favoured by these depositors. The sensitivity of non-bank deposits to deposit insurance policies opens up the possibility of international regulatory competition in this area. The EU directive on deposit insurance imposes minimum standards on national deposit insurance policies. This directive, however, is silent on several important features of deposit insurance such as the level of the deposit insurance premium. Hence, it may not preclude regulatory competition in Europe.

Keywords: Deposit insurance; International deposits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Deposit insurance and international bank liabilities (2006)
Working Paper: Deposit insurance and international bank deposits (2003)
Working Paper: Deposit insurance and international bank deposits (2002)
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