Optimal Campaigning in Presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida

Strömberg, David
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Strömberg

No 3372, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper delivers a precise recommendation for how presidential candidates should allocate their resources to maximize the probability of gaining a majority in the Electoral College. A two-candidate, probabilistic-voting model reveals that more resources should be devoted to states which are likely to be decisive in the Electoral College and, at the same time, have very close state elections. The optimal strategies are empirically estimated using state-level opinion polls available in September of the election year. The model?s recommended campaign strategies closely resemble those used in actual campaigns. The Paper also analyses how the allocation of resources would change under the alternative electoral rule of a direct national vote for president.

Keywords: Elections; Political campaigns; Public expenditure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H50 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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