Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World

Andrew Newman
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Patrick Legros

No 3469, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching partners is not fully transferable has been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous to those that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficient conditions for matching to be monotone that are simple to express and easy to verify. We illustrate their application with some examples that are of independent interest.

Keywords: Assortative matching; Principal agent; Contract theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 I22 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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