Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions

Bjorn Eckbo () and Karin Thorburn ()

No 3481, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We argue that the existence of CEO private control benefits complements managerial reputation in counteracting costly shareholder risk-shifting incentives during severe financial distress, when job-loss may be imminent. We examine this argument empirically using bankruptcy filings in Sweden, where a filing automatically terminates CEO employment and requires the firm to be sold in an open auction. The median CEO income loss is a dramatic 40%, suggesting that bankruptcy filing damages CEO reputation. Empirical proxies for both CEO reputation and control benefits are significant determinants of the probability of the CEO being rehired by the buyer in the auction, as predicted. Moreover, we find that the rehired CEOs generate a post-bankruptcy accounting performance at par with industry rivals. The surprisingly strong survival characteristics of the reorganized firms are consistent with managerial conservatism ex ante, and help alleviate creditor concern with costly asset substitution designed to delay filing in an automatic bankruptcy auction system.

Keywords: Post-bankruptcy performance; Ceo turnover; Bankruptcy; Executive compensation; Private benefits of control; Risk-shifting incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 G33 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-law
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Journal Article: Control benefits and CEO discipline in automatic bankruptcy auctions (2003)
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