Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement

Kym Anderson

No 3578, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The dispute resolution procedures of the World Trade Organization allow sanctions to be imposed when a country is unwilling to bring a WTO-inconsistent trade measure into conformity. Apart from the fact that the procedure for triggering the retaliation process has ambiguities that need to be removed, the retaliation itself has some undesirable economic features. This Paper looks at why compensation is not preferred to retaliation and then examines five economic features of the temporary trade retaliation that WTO may permit under certain conditions. Both efficiency and equity concerns are raised. The Paper concludes with some suggestions for reforming this part of WTO dispute resolution during the review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that is due to be completed by May 2003.

Keywords: Wto; Dispute settlement; Compensation; Retaliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 K33 K42 Q17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Peculiarities of retaliation in WTO dispute settlement (2002)
Working Paper: Pecularities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement (2002)
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