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Does the New Economy Need New Governance? Ownership, Knowledge and Performance

David Audretsch () and Erik Lehmann ()

No 3626, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the implications of ownership and its induced incentives on firm performance in the ‘New Economy’. Instead of traditional performance we use firm survival on the stock market as the performance indicator. Using a unique data set of all 341 firms listed on the Neuer Markt, the German counterpart of the NASDAQ, our results differ from studies on more traditional firms. Ownership by CEOs has no influence on firm survival when introducing measurements of human capital and intellectual property rights. This confirms assumptions that firms in the ‘New Economy’ differ also in their governance structure from traditional firms.

Keywords: corporate governance; entrepreneurship; firm survival; new economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 G32 L11 M13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-ent
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