Delay in Contests

Helmut Bester and Kai Konrad

No 3784, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Why is there delay in contests? In this Paper we follow and extend the line of reasoning of Carl von Clausewitz to explain delay. For a given contest technology, delay may occur if there is an asymmetry between defense and attack, if the expected change in relative strengths is moderate, and if the additional cost of investment in future strength is low.

Keywords: Delay; Contest; Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B31 D74 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Delay in contests (2004)
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