Do Exporters Gain From VERs?
Jaime de Melo and
L. Winters
No 383, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
Previous literature has concentrated on the rent transfer accruing to exporting countries when a VER is binding. This paper studies the efficiency and distributional effects arising when VERs force factors out of industries in which they are most productive. A theoretical model of the industry under the VER is developed to establish qualitative conditions under which a VER will result in: spillovers of exports to unrestricted markets; industry contraction; and loss in national welfare. Key parameters of demand and supply are estimated for leather footwear exports from Taiwan subject to the USA Orderly Marketing Agreement, and their implications explored in a calibrated simulation exercise.
Keywords: Export Restraints; Exports; Manufacturing; Taiwan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990-03
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Related works:
Chapter: Do Exporters Gain from VERs? (2015) 
Chapter: Do exporters gain from VERs? (2015) 
Journal Article: Do exporters gain from VERs? (1993) 
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