Tax Incentives to Saving and Borrowing

Tullio Jappelli () and Luigi Pistaferri

No 3881, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The Paper reviews the literature on these tax incentives, with special focus on long-term saving, housing, and household liabilities. The Paper addresses several areas of policy intervention: (1) the interest rate effect on personal saving; (2) the effect of tax incentives on long-term mandatory saving programmes; (3) government programmes that target saving for home purchase; (4) government programmes that target health and saving for education; (5) the effect of tax incentives to borrow, rather than to save. For each of these five important issues, the Paper provides empirical evidence on the main characteristics of government programmes, with a special focus on middle-income countries. It also addresses a number of issues that should be of interest to policy-makers. First of all, on which grounds government policy should target some assets rather than others. Second, if tax-sheltered assets and liabilities lead to substitution away from more heavily taxed savings instruments or if they affect the overall level of saving. Finally, if there is any lesson that can be drawn from the experience of developed countries for the design of saving and borrowing incentives in middle-income countries.

Keywords: Tax incentives; Saving; Borrowing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3881 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3881

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3881

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().