Delegated Job Design

Hans Hvide and Todd Kaplan

No 3907, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Why do firms delegate job design decisions to workers, and what are the implications of such delegation? We develop a private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by choosing difficult tasks. Such signalling provides a more efficient allocation of talent inside the firm, but at the cost that low-ability workers must be compensated to be willing to self-sort. Career concerns put a limit to the efficiency of delegation: when market observability of job content is high, the compensation needed to get low ability workers to self-sort is high, and firms limit delegation to avoid cream-skimming of the high-ability workers. We investigate implications of the theory for how misallocation of talent within firms may occur and to the design optimal incentive contracts.

Keywords: Career concerns; Delegation; Discretion; Peter principle; Sun hydraulics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 D44 D82 J33 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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