International Unions

Alberto Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni () and Federico Etro ()

No 3913, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods or policies that generate spillovers across members. The trade-off between benefits of coordination and loss of independent policy-making endogenously determines size, composition and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the union?s size, may block enlargement processes and induce excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with non-uniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies focusing on arrangements relevant in the context of existing unions or federal states, like enhanced cooperation, subsidiarity, federal mandates and earmarked grants.

Keywords: Federalism; Political economy; European union; International unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H11 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

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Journal Article: International Unions (2005)
Working Paper: International Unions (2005)
Working Paper: International Unions (2003)
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