Divide et Impera: Optimal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized Crime

Giancarlo Spagnolo

No 3991, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to ?cheat? on partners. Optimally designed ?courageous? leniency programmes reward the first party that reports with the fines paid by all other parties and achieve the first best: complete and costless deterrence. ?Moderate? leniency programs that only reduce or cancel sanctions may deter organized crime (a) by protecting an agent that defects from fines and from other agents? punishment; and (b) by increasing the riskiness of crime/collusion, in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).

Keywords: Antitrust; Cartels; Collusion; Competition policy; Crime deterrence; Law enforcement; Leniency; Organized crime; Risk dominance; Self-reporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K40 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07
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