Auctions with Weakly Assymmetric Interdependent Values

Aner Sela, Arieh Gavious () and Gadi Fibich

No 4009, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study second price auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values where bidders' signals for the value are independently and identically distributed. We also prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among all standard auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values.

Keywords: Weakly assymetric auctions; Interdependent values; Perturbation analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-08
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