Takeovers and the Dynamics of Information Flows

Gilles Chemla

No 4051, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper analyses the effect of a possible takeover on information flows and on the terms of trade in business relationships. We consider a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately-informed stakeholder, a buyer for example. In our model, takeovers both increase the surplus from trade and enable the firm to extract a potentially higher share of the surplus from the buyer. The possibility of a takeover that leaves the buyer with a higher (lower) rent than the incumbent manager increases (decreases) the buyer's willingness to reveal their valuation. We suggest a number of testable predictions on the performance of takeover targets and trade credit.

Keywords: Takeovers; Information; Disclosure; Buyer; Price; Value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G34 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09
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