Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for US Tariff Preferences
Hiau Looi Kee (),
Marcelo Olarreaga () and
Peri Silva ()
No 4077, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
This Paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American countries. The basic framework is one developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are above 50%. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the US government’s objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to LAC exporters.
Keywords: latin america; political economy; Trade; united states (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F11 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Market access for sale: Latin America's lobbying for U.S. tariff preferences (2004)
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