Performance of Inflation Targeting Based on Constant Interest Rate Projections
Seppo Honkapohja () and
Kaushik Mitra ()
No 4126, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Monetary policy is sometimes formulated in terms of a target level of inflation, a fixed time horizon and a constant interest rate that is anticipated to achieve the target at the specified horizon. These requirements lead to constant interest rate (CIR) instrument rules. Using the standard New Keynesian model, it is shown that some forms of CIR policy lead to both indeterminacy of equilibria and instability under adaptive learning. Some other forms of CIR policy perform better, however. We also examine the properties of the different policy rules in the presence of inertial demand and price behaviour.
Keywords: indeterminacy; inertia in demand; inflation inertia; inflation targeting; instability under learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Performance of inflation targeting based on constant interest rate projections (2005)
Working Paper: Performance of Inflation Targeting Based On Constant Interest Rate Projections (2004)
Working Paper: Performance of Inflation Targeting Based on Constant Interest Rate Projections (2004)
Working Paper: Performance of Inflation Targeting Based on constant Interest Rate Projections (2004)
Working Paper: Performance of inflation targeting based on constant interest rate projections (2003)
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