Globalization and the Empowerment of Talent

Dalia Marin and Thierry Verdier

No 4129, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Globalization has been identified by many experts as a new way firms organize their activities and also as the emergence of talent as the new stakeholder in the firm. This Paper examines the role of trade integration for the changing nature of the corporation. International trade leads to a ?war for talent?, which makes it more likely that an organizational equilibrium emerges in the integrated world economy in which control is delegated to lower levels of the firms? hierarchy empowering human capital. Furthermore, trade integration is shown to lead to waves of outsourcing and to convergence in corporate cultures across countries.

Keywords: International trade with endogenous organizations; The rise of human capital; Theory of the firm; Rybczynski theorem of firm organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 F12 F14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Globalization and the empowerment of talent (2012)
Working Paper: Globalization and the empowerment of talent (2012)
Working Paper: Globalization and the Empowerment of Talent (2004)
Working Paper: Globalization and the empowerment of talent (2003)
Working Paper: Globalization and the Empowerment of Talent (2003)
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