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How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents

Andrea Ichino and Gerd Muehlheusser

No 4255, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper shows that over monitoring a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine loyalty and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. This intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we lose the opportunity to learn how the partner will behave when not monitored. Only by allowing the partner the possibility to misbehave is there a chance to determine their characteristics at a time when separation would be possible at a relatively low cost.

Keywords: asymmetric information; effort; M50; monitoring; probation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2004-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed

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Related works:
Journal Article: How often should you open the door?: Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents (2003) Downloads
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