Political Influence in a New Anti-Dumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico

Joseph Francois and Gunnar Niels

No 4297, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We examine the role of political factors in Mexico?s anti-dumping regime, considering both the characteristics of target countries subject to anti-dumping duties and industry-specific factors for sectors receiving protection. Our results are broadly consistent with the recent theoretical literature on endogenous protection, in terms of both the political costs and the political benefits of providing protection. They are also in line with the existing empirical literature on anti-dumping, which is focused primarily on the experience of the US and the EU. Our results also suggest that WTO Membership of trading partners increases the political costs of supplying administered protection.

Keywords: Anti-dumping; Political economy of trade policy; Mexico; Endogenous import protection; Endogenous tariffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Working Paper: Political Influence in a New Antidumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico (2004)
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