Political Influence in a New Anti-Dumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico

Joseph Francois and Gunnar Niels

No 4297, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We examine the role of political factors in Mexico?s anti-dumping regime, considering both the characteristics of target countries subject to anti-dumping duties and industry-specific factors for sectors receiving protection. Our results are broadly consistent with the recent theoretical literature on endogenous protection, in terms of both the political costs and the political benefits of providing protection. They are also in line with the existing empirical literature on anti-dumping, which is focused primarily on the experience of the US and the EU. Our results also suggest that WTO Membership of trading partners increases the political costs of supplying administered protection.

Keywords: Anti-dumping; Political economy of trade policy; Mexico; Endogenous import protection; Endogenous tariffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4297 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4297

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4297

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().