Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions

Aner Sela, Arieh Gavious () and Gadi Fibich

No 4331, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.

Keywords: Asymptotic methods; Asymmetric auctions; Revenue equivalence; Collusion; Large auctions; Risk-averse bidders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4331 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4331

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4331

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().