Anti-Trust Policy and National Growth: Some Evidence from Italy

Mario Forni, Elisabetta Allegra, Michele Grillo (michele.grillo@unicatt.it) and Lara Magnani

No 4373, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Anti-trust problems affecting markets for intermediate goods or services raise the input costs of firms operating in downstream sectors, which often face tough international competition. Such firms lose market share, thus worsening the economic performance of the country. We try to document the importance of this link between competition problems and growth by analysing Italian sectoral data. We find that sectors which depend more heavily on inputs and services produced in sectors suffering from competition problems perform worse in terms of net exports, export growth and output growth.

Keywords: Anti-trust; International competition; Growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L40 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4373 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Antitrust Policy and National Growth: Some Evidence from Italy (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4373

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP4373
orders@cepr.org

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (repec@cepr.org).