Robin Hood's Compromise: Land Reforms, Inequality, Redistribution and Moral Hazard

Gilat Levy and Oriana Bandiera

No 4410, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper analyses an unusually conservative type of redistribution. We take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that this type of reform reduces agency costs, thus increasing productivity, total surplus in the economy, and workers? welfare. Compared to the classic redistribution ?to the tiller? it does worse in terms of equity and does not give the poor a collaterizable asset but it is likely to be more sustainable, both economically and politically.

Keywords: Land reforms; Inequality; Redistribution; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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