Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors
Vicente Cuñat () and
Maria Guadalupe ()
No 4425, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
This Paper studies the effect of product market competition on the compensation packages that firms offer to their executives and in particular its impact on the sensitivity of pay to performance. To measure the effect of competition we use two different identification strategies on a panel of US executives. We exploit two deregulation episodes in the banking and financial sectors as quasi-natural experiments. We provide difference in differences estimates of the effect of competition on estimated performance-pay sensitivities and on the sensitivity of stock option grants. Our results indicate that a higher level of product market competition increases the performance pay sensitivity of executive compensation schemes.
Keywords: executive compensation; performance related pay; product market competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at email@example.com
Journal Article: Executive compensation and competition in the banking and financial sectors (2009)
Working Paper: Executive compensation and competition in the banking and financial sectors (2007)
Working Paper: Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors (2007)
Working Paper: Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4425
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=4425
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().