Pitfalls of a State-Dominated Financial System: The Case of China

Shang-Jin Wei and Genevieve Boyreau-Debray

No 4471, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper examines pitfalls of a state-dominated financial system in the context of China. These include possible segmentation of the internal capital market due to local government interference and misallocation of capital. First, we employ two standard tools from the international finance literature to analyse financial integration across Chinese provinces. Both tests confirm a similar (and somewhat surprising) picture: capital mobility within China is low! Furthermore, the degree of internal financial integration appears to have decreased, rather than increased, in the 1990s relative to the preceding period. Second, we document that the government tends to reallocate capital from more productive regions towards less productive ones. In this sense, a smaller role of the government in the financial sector might increase economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth.

Keywords: Risk sharing; Chinese economy; Financial integration; Internal capital markets; feldstein-horioka (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F30 G10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Pitfalls of a State-Dominated Financial System: The Case of China (2005)
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