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Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents

Timothy Besley () and Maitreesh Ghatak ()

No 4641, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private non-profits is the importance of missions, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This Paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching principals’ and agents’ mission preferences in increasing organizational efficiency and reducing the need for high-powered incentives. The framework developed in this Paper is applied to non-profits, school competition, and incentives in the public sector.

Keywords: competition; incentives; non-profits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H10 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
Date: 2004-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Competition and incentives with motivated agents (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Competition and incentives with motivated agents (2003) Downloads
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