Joint Production in Teams

Marco Battaglini

No 4702, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation generically exists if and only if Sum_a(i)/(n-1)

Keywords: Teams; Moral hazard; Incentives; Theory of the firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 J33 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Joint production in teams (2006)
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