Is There a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity?

Pierre Pestieau, Helmuth Cremer and Georges Casamatta ()

No 4706, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive workers.

Keywords: Pensions; Implicit taxation; Retirement age (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity? (2006)
Working Paper: Is there a political support for the double burden on prolonged activity? (2006)
Working Paper: Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity? (2006)
Working Paper: Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity? (2004)
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